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INTRODUCTION
For most telecommunications industry participants, the attraction of
using federalism arguments opportunistically is irresistible. For those
championing a forward-looking cost methodology to price access to
unbundled network elements in 1996, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) needed to mandate a national pricing standard that left
little discretion to state agencies. For those arguing for liberal unbundling
rules in 2003, it was critical that the FCC allow for state discretion in the
development of unbundling rules and not endorse a national set of rules. As
is often the case in the telecom policy wars, the regulatory federalism
arguments made in these cases were mostly result-oriented: those who argued
against state discretion in the development of cost methodologies-the new
entrants into the local telecommunications market-were the same entities who
argued for such discretion in developing unbundling policy (and vice versa).
* Thanks to Ray Gifford and Jon Nuechterlein for helpful comments and
encouragement.
Phil Weiser is Associate Professor of Law and Telecommunications at the University
of Colorado and is the Executive Director of the Silicon Flatirons Telecommunications
Program. A graduate of the New York University School of Law, he formerly clerked for Judge
David M. Ebel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and U.S. Supreme Court Justices Bryon
White and Ruth Bader Ginsberg. Prior to joining the University of Colorado, he served as
Senior Counsel to Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney General at the Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice. Professor Weiser teaches and writes in the areas of telecommunications
law, antitrust, and intellectual property.
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Amidst the mostly opportunistic uses of federalism-based arguments, it
is no easy task for regulators to develop a more careful understanding of the
possible architectures for regulatory federalism. During the long reign of the
Communications Act of 1934,' regulators operated under a dual federalism
model that rested on a jurisdictional divide between interstate and intrastate
communications. Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Telecom Act
or 1996 Act),2 however, regulators must conceptualize and implement a
cooperative federalism strategy that relies not on a division between, but on
a sharing of, federal and state authority. Both the prevalence of opportunistic
arguments related to federalism issues and the familiarity with the old dual
federalism model have made it difficult for industry participants to
appreciate-let alone explain-the more nuanced and effective approaches that
can result from a cooperative federalism regulatory strategy.'
This essay explains the nature of the Act's cooperative federalism
strategy and how it can help the FCC and the state agencies devise solutions
to nettlesome regulatory problems. In particular, it discusses how this strategy
relates to the enforcement of interconnection agreements that govern relations
between incumbent providers and new entrants into the local telephone
market, the ongoing debates over intercarrier compensation reform, and the
proper policy for the unbundling of the incumbent providers' local telephone
networks. In conclusion, it highlights how federal and state regulators have
yet to fully appreciate and accept the cooperative federalism framework,
thereby contributing to the continuing legal uncertainty surrounding the
Telecom Act's implementation.
I. THE BASICS OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
Although relatively new to the telecommunications industry, cooperative
federalism is a familiar feature in other regulatory regimes, including the
Medicaid Act and most environmental programs.' Put simply, cooperative
federalism involves the sharing of authority between federal and state
1. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 157 et seq.).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15,
18, and 47 U.S.C.).
3. For an example of one broad-brush view that rejects a role for states in
implementing the Act, see Peter Huber, Forget Federalism: Deregulate the Phones, NATIONAL
REVIEW ONLINE (Feb. 18, 2003), at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-
huber021803.asp ("The federalists lost the fight for a 'more granular' approach to telecom
regulation in 1996. They shouldn't want to win it now.").
4. For a review of a number of cooperative federalism programs, see U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGULATORY PROGRAMS, BALANCING FEDERAL AND STATE
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR STANDARD SETTING AND IMPLEMENTATION 8 (Mar. 2002).
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agencies, often leaving state agencies with discretion to implement broad
federal policy goals, binding criteria, or guidelines. In the telecommunications
area, the pole attachment amendments of 1978' provided an early illustrative
model of how cooperative federalism can work."
A critical advantage of a cooperative federalism approach is that it sets
forth a basic federal framework while allowing states to experiment within
certain contours. In short, the benefits of cooperative federalism as a
framework for "democratic experimentalism ' '" fall into four basic categories:
(1) respecting long-standing state interests and autonomy; (2) facilitating local
participation and greater accountability for public policies; (3) allowing for
local experimentation and interstate competition; and (4) relying on the
economy of local agencies (rather than creating or expanding a national
bureaucracy)." Particularly for situations where there are a number of
alternative plausible solutions, relying on state agencies can offer an
alternative to the risk of adopting a national approach that steers the wrong
course.
For the FCC to utilize the Telecom Act's cooperative federalism strategy
most effectively, it must first conceptualize what circumstances would justify
a unitary policy. For both federal and state regulators, it is often tempting to
assert one's own jurisdiction regardless of whether the benefits of uniformity
or diversity actually counsel for a unitary or flexible approach. To the extent
that the FCC can cabin its own claim to set uniform and state-displacing rules,
it can ensure that it facilitates the benefits of cooperative federalism. In
particular, the FCC should only insist on uniformity where there are
substantial and clear efficiencies from eliminating diverse approaches, where
a single approach is clearly optimal over others, or where there is a clear
showing that the costs of diversity outweigh the benefits of state
experimentation and implementation.
5. Communications Act Amendments of 1978 § 6,92 Stat. 35 (codified at47 U.S.C.
§ 224).
6. See 47 U.S.C. § 224(f) (2000) (requiring utilities to provide "nondiscriminatory
access to any pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way"). Under this regime, states may choose to
use the specific rates suggested by the FCC to simplify life for interstate companies, but are not
required to do so. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. New York Tel. Co., 134 F. Supp. 2d
490, 503-04 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
7. See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 60-73 (1998); Michael C. Dorf& Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLuM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
8. For a further discussion of these points, see Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative
Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 31 (1999) [hereinafter
Weiser, Chevron].
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To date, the FCC has not conceptualized the Act's cooperative
federalism strategy in a clear framework. Like many federal agencies and
institutions, the FCC often invokes the importance of national rules and
uniformity as an "incantation" rather than as a conclusion that flows from
reasoned analysis. If the FCC did develop an analytical framework for
evaluating the costs and benefits of uniformity in federal rules, it would take
an important step toward setting the terms of the regulatory federalism debate
and would limit the opportunistic use of federalism arguments. Ideally, this
framework would focus on the agency's confidence in the merits of a single
national approach, the costs resulting from the use of different institutions,
and the institutional competence of the state (as opposed to federal) agencies'
ability to handle the relevant task.
fl. THE REGULATION OF INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENTS
For courts and regulators who were steeped in the dual jurisdictional
framework of the 1934 Act, the 1996 Act's cooperative federalism
architecture presents a set of challenges. As an initial matter, courts and
regulators have often balked at the idea that the Act combines federal and state
authority in creative ways, particularly its call for state agencies to interpret
and implement federal law in the formation of interconnection agreements.9
As the Supreme Court made clear in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,
however, the Telecom Act took the novel course of relying on state agencies
to implement federal law." Even though the FCC has, at times, struggled to
appreciate this new regime, it has recognized that the Act's regulatory
architecture enables different states to experiment with approaches that are
9. See Weiser, Chevron, supra note 8, at 46 & n.171.
10. 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
11. Justice Scalia's description of the Act bears repeating:
[b]roadly extended [federal] law into the field of intrastate telecommunications, but
in a few specified areas (ratemaking, interconnection agreements, etc.) has left the
policy implications of that extension to be determined by state commissions,
which-within the broad range of lawful policymaking left open to administrative
agencies-are beyond federal control. Such a scheme is decidedly novel, and the
attendant legal questions, such as whether federal courts must defer to state agency
interpretations of federal law, are novel as well.
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 385 n.10 (1999).
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consistent with the statutory text and purpose unless and until it decides that
a single national standard is appropriate. 2
Under the Telecom Act's cooperative federalism strategy, the flexibility
and authority that the FCC possesses in making telecommunications policy
also inheres in state agencies who act under the oversight of the FCC. To
date, however, the federal courts have failed to appreciate this feature of the
Act's cooperative federalism design and two key corollaries that follow from
it. First, when state agencies act in a gap-filling role to address issues left
open by the statutory scheme and the FCC's regulations, they deserve the
same deference accorded to the FCC.' Second, when the state agencies
enforce the terms of interconnection agreements, they are enforcing a federal
regime and thus exercise the same authority that the FCC has under that
regime to design and enforce appropriate remedies. 4
Given its novelty, it should not be a surprise that the FCC and the courts
have only begun to embrace the implications of the Telecom Act's cooperative
federalism regulatory architecture. In a significant move in that direction, the
FCC did make clear that the Act contemplates that state agencies possess the
authority not merely to arbitrate interconnection agreements, but to enforce
them as well. 5 Similarly, the Supreme Court's decision in Wisconsin
Department of Health and Family Services v. Blumer,"6 albeit arising in the
Medicaid Act context (and dealing with the rules governing spousal
impoverishment provisions), sends a clear message to the lower courts to
respect state discretion in implementing cooperative federalism regulatory
programs. To be sure, Blumer did not state specifically that federal courts
should accord Chevron7 deference to state agencies, but it emphasized the
12. In deciding what elements of the network should be unbundled, the FCC took just
this approach, first allowing states to decide on their own whether to mandate subloop
unbundling, but later adopting regulations requiring that this element of the incumbent's
network be unbundled and made available in all states. See Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common
Law, Cooperative Federalism, and The Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1692, 1740-41 (2001) [hereinafter Weiser, Federal Common Law].
13. See Weiser, Chevron, supra note 8, at 30.
14. See Weiser, Federal Common Law, supra note 12, at 1752-66.
15. See StarpowerConmunications, L.L.C., 15 F.C.C.R. 11277,11279 (une 14,2000)
(concluding that "a dispute arising from interconnection agreements and seeking interpretation
and enforcement of those agreements is within the states' 'responsibility' under section 252").
16. 534 U.S. 473 (2002).
17. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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importance of state agency discretion in implementing cooperative federalism
programs.
8
Whether state agency-made rules governing violations of the Telecom
Act are federal or state law in nature continues to perplex regulators, courts,
and commentators. This issue is particularly challenging because there are
two forms of cooperative federalism programs: ones where state agencies
develop federal rules and ones where state rules fill in a federal regime.' In
many cases, the distinction between these two regulatory architectures is not
significant. But when contemplating the scope of available remedies for
violations of interconnection agreements, the difference called for by the two
approaches can be quite significant, particularly where the authority under the
federal regime might well be more open-ended than the constrained state-law
18. Justice Ginsburg's discussion of the issue bears notice:
We therefore do not definitively resolve that matter, although we note that the leeway
for state choices urged by both Wisconsin and the United States is characteristic of
Medicaid. The Medicaid statute, in which the MCCA is implanted, is designed to
advance cooperative federalism. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980).
When interpreting other statutes so structured, we have not been reluctant to leave a
range of permissible choices to the States, at least where the superintending federal
agency has concluded that such latitude is consistent with the statute's aims.... In
a recently proposed rule, the Secretary declared that 'in the spirit of Federalism,' the
Federal Government 'should leave to States the decision as to which alternative
[income-first or resources-first] to use.' 66 Fed. Reg. 46763,46767 (2001).... We
perceive nothing in the Act contradicting the Secretary's conclusion that [divesting
the states of discretion in this area] is unnecessary and unwarranted.
Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 495-98 (2002).
19. See Weiser, Federal Common Law, supra note 13, at 1696-98 (discussing the
issue). Indeed, the interplay between federal and state law can get quite complicated. As the
Fourth Circuit viewed it, for example, the Surface Mining Control Act employed a cooperative
federalism strategy under which "after a State enacts statutes and regulations that are approved
by the Secretary, these statutes and regulations become operative, and the federal law and
regulations [that set forth the basic policy goals], while continuing to provide the 'blueprint'
against which to evaluate the State's program, 'drop out' as operative provisions." Bragg v. W.
Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 289 (4th Cir. 2001). By contrast, as explained in Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, the Clean Water Act's regulations "effectively incorporate" state law into the federal
regulatory regime, making state law, in certain circumstances, federal law. 503 U.S. 91, 110
(1992).
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authority.2" At bottom, however, the appropriate role for and conception of
state agencies within cooperative federalism regimes should turn on whether
they are entrusted by both Congress and the federal agency with a delegation
[ofi "general authority to make rules with force of law."'"
Under current law, the ability of state agencies to rely on federal
authority to enforce interconnection agreements remains somewhat uncertain.
As I have explained elsewhere, I believe the state agencies are authorized by
the Act-unless limited by FCC rules-to develop federal regulations to enforce
the violations of interconnection agreements.2 To date, most courts have
balked at this conception of cooperative federalism, generally viewing
interconnection agreements as creatures of state law.23 Presumably, unless
and until either Congress or the FCC provide clearer guidance on the Act's
enforcement regime, courts will continue to resist any claims that state
agencies are, in effect, authorized to make federal common law in the process
20. For a discussion of this point, see Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional
Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 674-693 (2001) [hereinafter
Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture] (arguing that, in absence of state statute
declining jurisdiction, federal grant ofjurisdiction enables a public utility commission to act).
To date, courts have differed on whether a grant of federal authority can enable a state court (or
agency) to act in the absence of express state enabling authority, though the majority view is that
.such grants of authority can confer jurisdiction. Compare Kaplan v. Democrat & Chronicle,
698 N.Y.S.2d 799, 800 (App. Div. 1999) (state court has jurisdiction to implement federal
regime in the absence of state statute declining jurisdiction) with R.A. Ponte Architects, Ltd. v.
Investors' Alert, Inc., 815 A.2d 816, 817, 827 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (based on action prior
to the federal statute, a state court lacks authority to implement a federal statute without later
state conferral ofjurisdiction).
21. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,237 (2001).
22. See Weiser, Federal Common Law, supra note 12, at 1752-1766.
23. See Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., Inc., 323 F.3d
348, 355 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying state law and noting that "[s]everal federal courts have held
that a state commission's contractual interpretation of an interconnection agreement is governed
by state, not federal, law."); see also BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. MCIMetro Access
Transmission Seres., Inc., 278 F.3d 1223, 1244 (11th Cir. 2002) (Barkett, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the entire Act's enforcement regime is a matter of state law). Nonetheless, a
number of courts have recognized that interconnection agreements are special forms of contracts
that may embody remedy provisions outside those associated with normal contracts. See, e.g.,
Ind. Bell Tel. Co. v. Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm'n, 2003 WL 1903363, *6 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 11,
2003) (noting that performance assurance provisions serve to "'encourage compliance with
[interconnection] agreements by setting forth clear remedies where [an incumbent] fails to
comply' with their interconnection agreements,") (quoting US West Communications, Inc. v.
Hix, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1121-22 (D. Colo. 1999)); see also Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 2003 WL
1903363 at *9 (concluding that state agency has authority under the Telecom Act to develop
special remedy provisions).
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of enforcing interconnection agreements.24 In a welcome move, however, the
FCC recently clarified that its role in enforcing interconnection agreements is
as an alternate forum to state agencies and that it is the role of the federal
district courts-and not the FCC-to review the enforcement decisions of the
state agencies.25
III. INTERCARRIER COMPENSATION REFORM
A major challenge on the FCC's agenda is to reform the existing regime
ofintercarrier compensation, which governs how much carriers pay each other
when they hand off traffic to one another. In principle, the FCC intends to
reform this regime to facilitate convergence between different types of
services-local, wireless, Internet, etc.-so that the regulatory treatment of
different technologies does not give any particular one an artificial advantage
in the marketplace (i.e., provide for different payments based on the particular
technology or use of the network). The FCC's early efforts to reform
reciprocal compensation arrangements between local providers, which focused
on regulating the pricing of calls to Internet Service Providers, ignored the fact
that the 1996 Act displaced the old dual jurisdictional model. In particular,
the FCC initially failed to appreciate that it did not need to establish the
interstate nature of telephone calls to Internet Service Providers in order to
justify the promulgation of rules concerning reciprocal compensation for these
calls.26 As the D.C. Circuit later explained, the FCC's authority under the
24. See, e.g., Verizon Md. Inc. v. RCN Telecom Servs., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 468,478
(D. Md. 2003) ('The 1996 Act evinces no congressional intent that federal courts-much less
state administrative agencies-craft a federal common law of contract interpretation to construe
the provisions ofinterconnection agreements."). Congressional clarification of this point seems
unlikely, as a provision of the Senate version of the Telecommunications Act specified a federal
measure of damage remedy for interconnection agreement violations ($1 million per day fine),
but it was removed entirely from the legislation and the issue was left unaddressed. See
Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995, S. 652, 104th Cong., available
by search at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/c 108query.html.
25. See CoreComm Communications, Inc. v. SBC Communications Inc., 18 F.C.C.R.
7568, 7573-76 113-19 (Apr. 17, 2003); see also Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 323 F.3d at 361 (Moore,
J., concurring) (explaining importance ofjudicial review of state agency decisions). To put in
perspective the length of time it can take to flesh out the details of an enforcement regime, the
Supreme Court is just now set to consider whether a state agency action regarding pollution
control decisions can be second-guessed by the EPA. See Alaska v. United States Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 298 F.3d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, U.S._., 123 S.Ct. 1253 (2003).
26. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689, 3690 1 (Feb. 26, 1999).
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1996 Act to define the appropriate reciprocal compensation regime, and not
its jurisdiction over interstate calls, governs the resolution of this issue.27
Even with the benefit of the D.C. Circuit's guidance, the FCC's
subsequent action on remand still failed to adhere to a cooperative federalism
model, instead assuming sole jurisdiction on the question and calling for a
single national approach.2" In so doing, the FCC again failed to focus on the
Act's provision that governed reciprocal compensation (Section 251).
Unfortunately, the FCC's approach not only failed to implement the
appropriate statutory provision, but also missed the opportunity to enlist the
states as partners in addressing this issue.29 To be fair to the FCC, its
avoidance of the section 251 cooperative federalism architecture might have
reflected its concern that the section 251 reciprocal compensation regime
overly restricted its discretion, but even this fear appears unwarranted in light
of the D.C. Circuit's treatment of the issue.30
In the wake of a second remand from the D.C. Circuit,3 the FCC is
undertaking an ambitious effort to reform all intercarrier compensation
arrangements. The Commission's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, unlike its
past actions, reflects a clear awareness of the opportunity to enlist the states
as partners in this enterprise. 32 This awareness, however, only begs the more
difficult question of what alternative conceptions of regulatory federalism
could make effective use of the state agencies in this reform effort. With
respect to reforming intercarrier compensation arrangements, I will discuss
five ways of defining a national goal for a unified regime and relying on the
states to help implement it.
First, the FCC could set a basic approach and leave state agencies with
the flexibility to get to that goal by a certain period of time. In the intercarrier
compensation area, the two basic policies that the FCC might adopt are either
one that imposes a "calling party pays approach" (which raises the question
of how much should be paid for transport and termination) or a "bill and keep"
27. See Bell At. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
28. The FCC later recognized that its action was in tension with the spirit, if not the
letter, of the D.C. Circuit's decision. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 16 F.C.C.R. 9151, 9165 n.56 (Apr. 27, 2001).
29. Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth recognized this point in dissent. See id. at 9214
(noting how FCC's approach did not demonstrate "a modicum of respect for States").
30. See WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 288 F.3d 429,434 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (explaining that
"there is plainly a non-trivial likelihood that the Commission has authority to... [require its
preferred policy] (perhaps under § § 251 (b)(5) and 252(d)(B)(i))").
3 1. See id. (remanding Order on the ground that the Commission made essentially the
same mistake as addressed in Bell Atl. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
32. See Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, 16 F.C.C.R. 9610,
9654 122 (Apr. 27, 2001).
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arrangement (which raises the question of where the "hand-off' of a call takes
place). By allowing the state agencies some flexibility in implementing its
chosen policy, the FCC would afford them the same type of flexibility allowed
in the environmental area, where state agencies are often given some leeway
to devise the best strategy for achieving certain levels of emissions. In
allowing state agencies some discretion in migrating away from the provision
of reciprocal compensation payments made for calls made to Internet Service
Providers, the FCC has already adopted a version of this strategy. Moreover,
such an approach might enable state regulators to implement intrastate access
charge reform along with the reform of other intercarrier compensation
systems.
Second, the FCC could mandate a particular policy and allow flexibility
within methods of enforcement. Take, for example, a scenario where the FCC
decides to mandate a bill and keep regime for all traffic exchanged between
networks. This regime might well rely on certain balanced traffic
requirements-e.g., to preclude free riding (just serving telemarketers)-that
could be policed by the states.
Third, the FCC could adopt a general policy but leave open for flexibility
certain details of that policy. In the intercarrier compensation area, one such
important detail might be defining where transport must be provided to-e.g.,
the point of physical interconnection or to the carrier's central office. The
FCC could, as an initial matter at least, leave that choice up to the state
agencies and only later decide whether to mandate a particular approach.
Fourth, the FCC could mandate one or more sets of permissible
approaches, but leave open the door for it to waive this mandate if a state
proposed an alternative approach that it deemed acceptable. In the Medicaid
Act and welfare context, for example, cooperative federalism programs often
rely on this strategy, presuming that the federal agency might not have
evaluated all appropriate approaches at the outset.33 This approach goes hand-
in-hand with the classic cooperative federalism tool of requiring a state agency
to report back to the federal agency on its approach so that the federal agency
can certify it as permissible. Insofar as this model leaves open the door to
multiple strategies, it is important that the federal agency, or an organization
of state agencies, publicize "model rules" emerging from the experience of the
states. This practice enables good ideas to spread and bad experiments to be
avoided.
Finally, the FCC could set up a regime of conditional participation that
would delegate federal authority to individual states on the condition that they
33. For a discussion of the use of waivers in the Medicaid context, see Judith M.
Rosenberg & David T. Zaring, Managing Medicaid Waivers: Section 1115 and State Health
Care Reform, 32 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 545 (1995).
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took certain actions. Under this approach, the opportunity to implement the
federal regime for a particular state would be allowed only if that state's
regulations were also aligned to meet the federal regime's basic policy goals.
Alternatively, the FCC could condition the receipt of universal service funding
upon state compliance with federal directives. In implementing either of these
two approaches, however, the federal agency should be careful to leave a state
with discretion not to follow this model of regulation at all, lest it veer away
from a cooperative federalism strategy to a coercive one.34
IV. UNBUNDLING POLICY
In the first chapter of developing the rules for unbundling the
incumbents' local telephone network, the FCC set forth an ambitious set of
local competition rules." On the whole, the FCC's vision for the Telecom Act
failed to appreciate the important role played by state agencies and in word,
if not in deed, suggested that the states should not be given much discretion
to implement the Act. Given the high stakes involved the Act's
implementation and the continuing confusion as to whether the Act replaced
the old dual jurisdictional framework with a cooperative federalism one, it is
quite possible that any approach to the role of the states would have spurred
a contentious round of litigation. But because the FCC's philosophy on the
appropriate approach to unbundling and regulating the prices of wholesale
access to the local network purported to leave a marginal role for the states,
the litigation following the FCC's Local Competition Order36 often featured
diametrically opposed views about the regime put in place by the Act.
The judicial decisions in the wake of the Act's implementation
underscored two key elements of cooperative federalism. First, the Supreme
Court's ruling in the Iowa Utilities case explained that the implementation of
the Telecom Act fell within the scope of the FCC's purview and that the FCC
enjoyed residual authority to define its terms as it saw fit.37 Second, as to the
FCC's use of that authority, the courts have explained that a failure to use
state agencies to implement the Act in apparently sensible ways needs to be
explained. Take, for example, the FCC's decision not to allow the state
agencies any discretion to reduce-based on local circumstances-the list of the
34. The importance of this option is a key aspect of developing a constitutional
framework for cooperative federalism. See Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture,
supra note 20, at 693-707.
35. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 (Aug. 8, 1996).
36. 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 (Aug. 8, 1996).
37. See AT&T Corp. v. Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 (1999).
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elements that must be unbundled from the incumbents' network and made
available to new entrants. In so ruling, the FCC cited the concern that so
doing would frustrate the business plans of the new entrants."a On review,
however, the D.C. Circuit criticized this regulation, explaining that the FCC's
rationales for an "undifferentiated national rule" did not hold up upon close
examination.39
In its Triennial Review decision, ° the FCC attempted to address the D.C.
Circuit's analysis and to develop a new regime for local competition that
learned from the lessons of the seven years since the Act's passage.
Unfortunately, in its perplexing decision, the FCC failed to provide a coherent
view of regulatory federalism. In short, the decision failed to offer any self-
conscious vision about when national policy requires a single approach and
when state agencies can be relied on to implement the Act's call to unbundle
elements of the incumbent providers' network. On one set of issues, involving
the "line sharing" requirement, the FCC left the states with no opportunity to
mandate this policy (which had been initiated at the state level before being
mandated nationwide), but for another critical issue, involving "unbundled
switching," the FCC left the states with enormous discretion. By failing to
adopt a principled vision of regulatory federalism, the FCC only encouraged
more selective uses of regulatory federalism arguments and left its decision
vulnerable to a legal challenge.
CONCLUSION
The role of the state agencies in implementing the Telecommunication
Act of 1996 should be a constructive partnership with the FCC in advancing
the Act's goals. Through a number of different approaches ranging from
allowing waiver requests to diversity in implementation, a cooperative
federalism strategy can enable state agencies to exercise discretion where
there is no clearly optimal uniform strategy. Unfortunately, as evidenced by
the FCC's Triennial Review decision, the FCC has yet to fully embrace such
a partnership with the state agencies, instead invoking the virtues of state
discretion only selectively and inconsistently, thereby adding to the continuing
legal uncertainty and confusion about how the Act operates.
Over time, both federal and state regulators may well come to appreciate
the benefits of the Act's cooperative federalism architecture. Unlike the
38. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 3767 154 (Nov. 5, 1999).
39. United States Telecom Ass'n. v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415,422-26 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
40. Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978 (Aug. 21, 2003).
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environmental and Medicaid Act policy worlds, where state regulators only
used a cooperative federalism strategy, telecommunications regulators grew
up under a dual jurisdiction model. Thus, for many regulators, the transition
to a cooperative federalism approach creates a form of culture shock and will
take time to set in. The quicker this transition proceeds, however, the more
effectively regulators will be able to deal with difficult questions such as
enforcing interconnection agreements, reforming intercarrier compensation
arrangements, and developing unbundling policy.

